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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
KENNETH RAY UNDERWOOD, : 
Appellate Court No. 20070216-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a finding of guilt of Burglary, a second degree 
felony in violation of §76-6-202, and for Theft, a second degree felony in 
violation of §76-6-404. The Defendant was found guilty at a bench trial on 
September 27, 2005. He was sentenced November 3, 2005, to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years on the burglary 
charge and an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years on theft charge, to be served concurrently, by the Honorable 
Parley R. Baldwin of the Second District Court of Weber County. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WAS THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO CONFRONT WITNESSES VIOLATED AND WAS 
IMPROPER EVIDENCE ADMITTED WHEN HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 
THROUGH SEVERAL WITNESSES? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Our standard of review on the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence is complex, since the determination of admissibility 'often 
contains a number of rulings, each of which may require a different standard of 
review.'" State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 10, 122 P.3d 639 (quoting Norman 
H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 (1999)). 
Legal questions regarding admissibility are reviewed for correctness, and 
questions of fact are reviewed for clear error. See id. And, "[f]inally, we review 
the district court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion." Id. 
{State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517 If 10, 153 P.3d 830) 
POINTII 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OR 
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S 
CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS 
INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should use a question of law 
standard of review. "We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we 
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant 
conviction." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Furthermore, this Court should review the evidence "in a light most favorable 
to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and 
reverse the Defendant's conviction only if "the evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime." Smith, 927 P.2d at 
651 (citations and quotations omitted). Since Defendant didn't move for a 
directed verdict, it should be reviewed under a plain error standard of review. 
"[T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from 
an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant..." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
POINT III 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 
3 
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY THE TRIAL COURT'S EARLY 
DENIAL OF OBJECTIONS, WHICH TRAINED THE 
DEFENDANT NOT TO OBJECT, AND BY HIS FAILURE 
TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter 
of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part test, which 
was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine 
whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
POINT IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE COINS 
OBTAINED FROM ATTORNEY CRAMER'S OFFICER 
WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY 
ESTABLISH A PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF 
EVIDENCE? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: Preservation of the issue: The Defendant 
properly preserved this issue by making several objections to the introduction 
of evidence of the coins. Standard of review; A trial court's determination 
that there was a proper foundation for the admission of evidence "will not be 
overturned unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Madsen, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1972) 
POINT V 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE SEVERAL EXHIBITS OVER THE 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AND AFTER THE 
PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENDANT HAD BOTH 
RESTED THEIR CASE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Preservation of the issue: The Defendanl 
properly preserved this issue by objection to the introduction of the exhibits 
after the State and defense had both rested. Standard of review: The 
interpretation of case law presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness 
State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, \ 7, 151 P.3d 171, 
POINT VI 
WAS THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO A FAIR TRIAL VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE 
NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT OCCURRED DURING HIS 
TRIAL? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine whether the 
cumulative effect of the errors during the trial deprived the Defendant a fair 
trial. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if 4the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a 
fair trial was had.'5' State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000)(quoting State 
v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 277 (Utah 1998)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fifth Amendment 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsoiy process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
6 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and 
bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any 
debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such 
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
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Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution 
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
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(b)theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses 
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the 
actor while he is in the building. 
§76-6-404. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, 
for good cause, otherwise permits; 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 504 See attached Addendum B. 
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Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant: 
(a)(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(a)(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(a)(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(a)(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(a)(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement 
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of 
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing 
of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(b)(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(b)(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(b)(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so 
far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the 
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declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to 
be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(b)(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the 
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the 
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with Burglary, a second 
degree felony, and Theft, a second degree felony. (R. 001-2). A bench trial 
was held on September 26 and 27, 2005, wherein the Defendant was found 
guilty on both counts. Defendant was sentenced on November 3, 2005 (R. 
139-140) to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years on the second degree felony Burglary, and an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years on the second degree 
felony Theft at the Utah State Prison to be concurrent. Defendant filed a 
Notice of Appeal on October 11, 2006, (R. 181-182) and counsel filed a Notice 
of Appeal on November 30, 2006 (R. 212-213). A Motion to Reinstate a 
Denied Right to Appeal was filed February 7, 2007 (R. 237-240) and the Order 
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Reinstating a Denied Right to Appeal was entered on February 27, 2007 (R. 
255-258). A Notice of Appeal was again filed with the Court on March 2, 
2007 (R. 259-260). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with a second-degree felony car theft and a 
second-degree felony house burglary. The Defendant waived his right to jury, 
and the matter was tried before the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin on September 
26 and 27, 2005. Prior to the trial commencing the court again asked the 
Defendant if he wanted to proceed in a pro se capacity. The Defendant agreed 
to do so, and the court appointed a public defender to sit through the trial as 
standby counsel for Mr. Underwood in the proceedings. The attorney 
specifically stated that he was not there to make objections during the course of 
the trial. 
The State's first witness was the Defendant's wife, Susan Weight, who 
admitted that she had been previously convicted of two felony forgery charges 
and a theft by deception felony. 
She testified that at the time of the alleged offense the Defendant and she 
had been separated for several months (R.308/21) On August 15, 2004, Ms. 
Weight returned from going to church and noticed that her sister's car was 
gone. (R.308/26) She and her family immediately went into the home; and she 
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discovered that her purse, which contained her wallet, cell phone, and a True 
Value pocket knife, was also missing. Several months later, in December 2004 
after the parties were divorced, the Defendant then contacted the witness and 
allowed her to pick up certain items of property from his property being held at 
the Weber County jail. As she was going through those items she found the 
pocket knife, a picture that had been cut from her driver's license, a picture of 
their son Wyatt, and some postage stamps, together with a listing of cell phone 
numbers. (R.308/35) 
Ms. Weight testified that in the first part of December 2004 the 
Defendant called her and informed her that his attorney had possession of some 
medallions that had been allegedly taken from the premises. (R.308/41) 
During cross examination she admitted that she had no evidence that the 
Defendant had entered the house on August 15 nor had she ever seen the 
Defendant drive her sister's vehicle. (R.308/82) 
During the course of the investigation information was obtained 
regarding the use of an IP address from a stolen laptop computer. Ms. Weight 
testified that the IP address was used from the stolen laptop on September 19, 
2004, and September 21, 2004, during a time that the Defendant was locked up 
in the St. George County jail. (R.308/87) 
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The State called Stephanie Miya to the stand to testify. Ms. Miya had 
previously been the Defendant's attorney and was being called to testify 
regarding certain items of property that she picked up at the Defendant's 
request. The Defendant objected to her testimony as a violation of Rule 504 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. The court overruled that objection and ordered 
that she testify. (R.308/56-64) Ms. Miya testified she had received and taken 
two documents from the Defendant and presented one (plaintiffs exhibit 
number four) to a pawn shop in Mesquite and picked up a box that contained a 
number of unknown items. (R.308 /65-66) She then took the other document 
(plaintiffs exhibit number six) to a pawn shop in Salt Lake City and picked up 
a box containing unknown items at that pawn shop. She stated that she never 
opened the boxes and therefore never knew of the contents. She testified that 
these boxes were then delivered to Attorney Aric Cramer's office. Attorney 
Cramer never testified; but the victim, Mr. Sheryl Weight, testified that he 
observed loose coins on a table at Mr. Cramer's office and identified those 
coins as being similar to the coins taken from the home of the victim. 
During the course of the trial the prosecution asked numerous leading 
questions. The Defendant, acting in a pro se capacity, finally objected to the 
leading questions, which objection was overruled. (R.308 /104) Immediately 
after the objection, the prosecution went through the following set of questions: 
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Q. Did you tell [detective Quinney] that certain coins would not 
be there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would those have been the ones that were in your 
cabinet? 
A. They were the ones left in the cabinet. (R.308 /104) 
Later in the trial the Defendant again objected to the prosecution's 
leading statements. This objection came immediately after the prosecutor asked 
a witness concerning a specific date to which he answered he did not 
remember. The prosecutor then posed a question as follows: 
Q. Now, calling your attention back to that period of time soon 
after - or in the 20's, say in August of 2003. You've indicated 
that you were at the tattoo parlor or the tattoo shop. Did you see-? 
The Defendant lodged his objection however the court ruled that the 
question was not objectionable and could be answered. (R.308/147, 148) The 
prosecution again followed with another leading question: 
Q. Were you, on the date that the Defendant came into your store, 
acquainted with the fact that your brother-in-law's home at 481 
East 2850 North in North Ogden had been burglarized, and 
Serena, your sister inlaw's car stolen? (R.308/148) 
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The prosecution continued to ask leading questions throughout the trial. 
Attached as Addendum C is a list of the leading questions asked throughout the 
trial as well as the hearsay evidence introduced at trial. The citations are so 
numerous that they have simply been referred to by the page and line number, 
rather than including the context of each statement. 
A St. George pawn shop owner, Jason Ray, testified that on August 18, 
2004, Defendant came into the store and told him that his car had broken down 
on the freeway or interstate. (R.309/190) The Defendant then sold Mr. Ray a 
1898 $10 gold piece for $200. (R.309/191) Mr. Ray did not recall a 
description of the coin other than it was a $10 gold piece and testified that there 
was no chain or anything attached to the gold piece. (R.309 /195) That coin 
was never recovered. 
Detective Quinney then gave a string of hearsay testimony in which he 
talked about two other officers who informed him they had picked up a 2002 
Salt Lake Olympic coin at a pawn shop in St. George. (R.309/203) He then 
testified that he talked to individuals or examined records that indicated that the 
Defendant had pawned some items in Mesquite, Nevada, or St. George, Utah. 
(R.308/208) 
Detective Quinney also testified that he had gone to a pawn shop in Salt 
Lake City and discovered that a group of coins had been pawned by someone 
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and later retrieved by Stephanie Miya. (R. 309/211) Detective Quinney 
testified that a Deputy Cardinal told him that the victim's vehicle had been 
located in Scenic, Arizona. (R.309/214) Mr. Underwood objected to this 
testimony and to the receiving of photographs of the location where the car was 
supposedly found; however, the court again overruled those objections. (R.309 
/217) 
Detective Quinney testified, again in a hearsay manner, that he had been 
told by someone at Tri-State Towing that they had picked up the automobile in 
question in Nevada and moved it to their lot in Ogden. Detective Quinney 
testified that he examined the vehicle and saw that it had been hotwired. 
(R.309/220) 
Upon cross examination, Detective Quinney acknowledged that they did 
not find any fingerprints of the Defendant at the home that had been 
burglarized, nor on the vehicle that had been stolen. (R.309/235, 243) 
Detective Quinney further acknowledged that the vehicle in question was 
located on September 26, 2004, and that the Defendant had been incarcerated 
from September 9, 2004, until after September 26. (R.309/237) Detective 
Quinney further testified that the individual that had found the car stated that 
the car had not been there on September 25, 2004. (R.309/241) 
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During the trial it became apparent that there were significant 
discrepancies between the letter from the Defendant authorizing his attorney to 
pick up 40 proof sets of coins from the pawn shop, the pawn shop slip which 
stated that there were eight proof sets, and the number of proof sets entered 
into evidence which was seven. (R.309/257-259) Detective Quinney 
acknowledged that he could not say that the proof sets picked up at Attorney 
Cramer's office were the same ones that came from Crown Jewel and Pawn 
(R.309/267). Detective Quinney further acknowledged that he had not seen a 
$10goldpiece. (R.309/271) 
Detective Quinney further testified, "a description of the things that were 
pawned on these pawn slips are not detailed enough to match them up" to those 
items viewed at Attorney Cramer's office. (R.309/312) He further 
acknowledged that the 88 coins picked up at the Virgin Valley Pawn shop were 
simply 88 coins with no reference to LDS Temple Coins. (R.309/315) 
The manager of Crown Jewel and Pawn testified that he could not 
identify the Defendant as the individual that had pawned some items in the 
store. (R.309/280) He testified that an individual named Kenneth Underwood 
pawned a number of coins and that he later released those to Attorney Miya, 
pursuant to a letter signed by Underwood allowing their release. (R.309/289) 
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The State rested its case and immediately thereafter the Defendant 
rested. After both sides had rested, the prosecution then made motions to enter 
a number of exhibits into evidence. These exhibits included numbers 28, 16, 
10, 11, 12, and 13. These exhibits were entered into evidence over the 
Defendant's objection, although the Defendant did not articulate the objection 
properly. (R.309/332, 333) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant raises six points on appeal. First, that the Defendant's 
Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated through numerous 
instances of hearsay testimony. It is undisputed that the Defendant was 
representing himself in a pro se capacity. During the course of the trial the 
State code on evidence shows that was clearly hearsay, and violated the 
Defendants constitutional right to confront his accusers. Despite the fact that 
the Defendant lacked legal training, he objected to the hearsay testimony 
(albeit not raising the constitutional implications), which objection was 
overruled by the trial court. Those items of hearsay included evidence as to the 
location and condition of the automobile that had been stolen from the victims, 
and implied possession of a number of items of evidence seized from attorney 
Cramer's office. 
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Second, the trial court failed to dismiss the case for lack of evidence 
after both the State and Defendant had rested. The Defendant believes that had 
the trial court made proper rulings on objections, thereby excluding evidence of 
the coins, evidence of the automobile, and other objections, there would have 
been insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict. 
Third, the trial court, through various incorrect rulings on significant 
issues raised by objections by the pro se Defendant, in essence trained the 
Defendant incorrectly that these objections had no merit. Once the Defendant 
had been overruled on this objection, he failed to make any further objections 
on those particular grounds, thereby allowing into evidence numerous hearsay 
statements and numerous statements obtained via leading questions. Without 
these original errors by trial court, the Defendant would have continued 
objecting thereby excluding from trial sufficient evidence to sustain a motion 
for a directed verdict. In essence, the Defendant, by virtue of the early incorrect 
rulings of the trial court, was thereafter rendered ineffective, violating his Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel. 
Fourth, the trial court allowed into evidence testimony regarding a 
number of coins that were recovered from Attorney Cramer's office. The 
State, for no apparent reason, failed to call a crucial witness in the chain of 
custody thereby calling into question the Defendant's connection to that 
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evidence. His trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to move the trial 
court for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case. 
Fifth, the trial court, over the objection of the pro se Defendant, entered 
into evidence six plaintiff exhibits after both the prosecution and the defense 
had rested. 
Finally, the five preceding points constitute cumulative error, which in 
essence would establish that the accumulation of these errors called into 
question the verdict in the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
CONFRONT WITNESSES WAS VIOLATED AND 
IMPROPER EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED WHEN 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE THROUGH SEVERAL WITNESSES. 
During the course of the trial, the prosecution utilized numerous hearsay 
statements. Although the Defendant had standby counsel, he was operating in 
the capacity of a pro se defendant throughout the trial. During the trial the 
prosecution attempted to introduce evidence which was clearly hearsay. 
Detective Quinney testified that a Deputy Cardinal told him that the victim's 
vehicle had been located in Scenic, Arizona. (R.309/214) Mr. Underwood 
objected to this testimony and to the receiving of photographs of the location 
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where the car was supposedly found; however, the court overruled those 
objections. (R.309/217) 
Numerous other items of hearsay testimony were ultimately entered into 
evidence. Shortly after the above-described exchange, the officer again 
testified to conversation he had had with another individual at Tri-State Auto 
regarding the location of the vehicle. Later in the trial, the prosecution put on 
evidence regarding a table full of coins, viewed by Mr. Weight at Attorney 
Cramer's office. Attorney Miya was not present at Attorney Cramer's office 
during any of these transactions. 
Although he would have been available, Attorney Cramer was never 
called to testify regarding the origin and chain of custody of the coins. While 
Attorney Miya testified that she had given Mr. Cramer a box of coins, it was 
left to the assumption of the judge that these were the same coins received by 
Attorney Miya. Unfortunately, these latter instances of hearsay, and implied 
hearsay, were not objected to by the Defendant. This is unfortunate, because 
the judge had overruled a previous hearsay objection which was legitimate, 
thereby creating in the Defendant an incorrect definition as to what constituted 
hearsay. 
The hearsay that was admitted into evidence was extremely prejudicial 
to the Defendant. By allowing the hearsay into evidence the Defendant was 
22 
denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Therefore, 
the judge was left with the statements from three different witnesses who did 
not testify that the vehicle had been abandoned in southern Utah or Nevada, 
and that the vehicle in question had been hot wired. Furthermore the failure of 
the prosecution to call Attorney Cramer to establish the proper chain of custody 
resulted in additional implied hearsay testimony that the coins in question were 
the same coins delivered by Attorney Miya to Cramer. It was only through 
these various hearsay violations that the Defendant was tied to virtually all of 
the relevant evidence connecting him to the crime. 
In State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "if the declarant is not present, the core values of the confrontation 
right are implicated because the essence of the confrontation right is the 
opportunity to have the accusing witness in court and subject to cross-
examination, so that bias and credibility can be evaluated by the finder of fact." 
M a t 1112. 
The Defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine these 
important witnesses against him. The judge heard their statements during the 
State's opening statement and again through Detective Quinney, but he did not 
get the opportunity to evaluate the witnesses' bias or credibility. 
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In State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "[i]f the evidence violates a defendant's right to confront 
witnesses, it should not be admitted." Id. at 480. The Court then adopted a 
two-part test to evaluate the extent of a violation of the right to confrontation. 
Id. "First, we look at whether the State's presentation of hearsay testimony of 
extrajudicial statements or occurrences is 'crucial to the state's case or 
'devastating' to the defendant." Id. 
In the case at bar, the hearsay testimony was clearly devastating to the 
Defendant. Without the hearsay testimony of Detective Quinney, the 
Defendant could not have been tied to the stolen vehicle. Without the implied 
hearsay from Mr. Weight, Attorney Miya, and Detective Quinney, the 
Defendant could not have been tied to the coins. Without these two crucial 
pieces of evidence, the state had little evidence on which to proceed. 
Since the hearsay testimony was devastating to the Defendant, the first 
part of the hearsay test is met. The second part of the test is "[s]econd, we look 
at the availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the declarant 
will add any probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to 
observe the demeanor of the witness." Id. 
In the present case, the State offered no explanation as to why these 
individuals were not called to testify. Although the State called Attorney Miya 
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to testify, they inexplicitly decided not to call Attorney Cramer. Furthermore, 
although the State called Detective Quinney, they did not call either the 
Nevada trooper or the owner of Tri-State Towing. There was no explanation 
given why these individuals were not called as witnesses. In Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 1000, S.Ct. 2531 (1980), the Supreme Court articulated a two part 
test for determining the admissibility of hearsay when a hearsay declarant is 
not present for cross-examination at trial. First, there must be a showing of 
'unavailability.' Second, if the declarant is unavailable, the statement at issue 
is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Id. At 66, 1000 
S.Ct. at 2539 (1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1994), "that constitutional unavailability is found only when it is 'practically 
impossible to produce the witness in court.'" Id. At 402 (quoting, State v. 
Webb, 779P.2dat l l l3) . 
The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Menzies, that "unavailability will 
not be found merely because the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand 
or . . . testifying would be stressful. In short, every reasonable effort must be 
made to produce the witness." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). In the 
present case, there is simply no evidence that the State made any effort to 
procure these necessary witnesses. In a situation where both the prosecution 
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and the trial court understand that a defendant is operating in a pro se capacity, 
extra effort should be made to ensure a defendant's constitutional rights are not 
violated. Likewise, the extraordinary effort should be made by both the 
prosecutor and the trial court to ensure that long-standing rules of evidence are 
complied with during the prosecution's case in chief. These efforts simply 
were not made, and a quantum of hearsay evidence was improperly admitted 
into evidence which prejudiced the Defendant. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF 
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S 
CASE FOR REASONS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION. 
In State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000), the Utah Supreme 
Court held, "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." However, this general rule is tempered when trial counsel's 
performance falls below a reasonable standard. This is particularly true in a 
situation where a defendant is proceeding on a pro se basis. This Court further 
stated, "[i]t necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it submits the 
case to the jury and thus fails to discharge a defendant when the insufficiency of 
the evidence is apparent to the court." Id. at 351 (emphasis added). 
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The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in 
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The Court's 
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence 
is limited." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, % 22 3 P.3d 192. The Utah 
Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 2001 UT 58, 
^65, 27 P.3d 1115, (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993), the Court stated, "[ojrdinarily, a reviewing court 
may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts 
in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict." 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court 
may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction 
of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid 
if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, 
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for 
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the 
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defendant's guilty verdict. Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443 (Utah 1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second 
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case 
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole 
evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the 
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to 
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he 
hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the 
Court also stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary 
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can 
take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a 
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be 
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt/<£ at 444-445. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 
P.3d 94, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of 
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined 
that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. 
No other evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was 
found; but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had 
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the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that 
conviction, the Court held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the 
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had 
the opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if 
indeed it ever existed. Id. at 100. 
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence 
in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an 
extensive marshaling of evidence the verdict cannot be supported. 
The problem with the State's case is that there are significant gaps in 
testimony received at trial that tie the Defendant to the crimes charged. The 
prosecution argued that the Defendant stole the vehicle in question on August 
15; and to support that theory claimed that he was without an automobile on 
that date. (Closing argument R.309/334) According to the State's theory the 
Defendant drove the vehicle to St. George and on August 18 pawned some 
items in St. George. At that time the vehicle is supposedly inoperable because 
the Defendant arrived in the pawn shop sweating, carrying a heavy bag, and 
stating that his car had broken down. However, by the 19th of August the 
Defendant somehow arrived in Mesquite, Nevada; and further, the Defendant 
somehow supposedly appeared in Salt Lake on August 23 to pawn additional 
coins without the benefit of a vehicle that had broken down on August 18. 
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Under the State's theory, the vehicle was hot wired sometime shortly after 
August 18. 
The Defendant was then arrested in St. George on or about September 9 
on unrelated charges; yet somehow the vehicle makes it down to Scenic, 
Arizona, on September 26 where the vehicle is apparently located by the 
police. The prosecution theorizes that the only method of transportation the 
Defendant would have to get to St. George is the stolen vehicle, (R.309/334) 
yet has no explanation as to how the Defendant traveled back to Salt Lake City 
and then again to St. George to be arrested in the vehicle that had broken down 
in St. George. 
The significant gaps in testimony continue in the prosecution's attempt 
to tie stolen coins to the Defendant. It is important to note that none of the 
coins in question were unique. It is also important to observe that the victim's 
list of stolen coins differs from the very cursory and inadequate list obtained 
from the pawn shop owners and further differs from the list of coins seized 
from Attorney Cramer's office. The prosecution further failed to put Attorney 
Cramer on the stand to testify as to the origin of the coins he delivered to the 
police. There is absolutely no evidence that those coins were the ones received 
from Attorney Miya, other than inadmissible hearsay. Is important to recognize 
that attorney Miya never testified that the items she received from the pawn 
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shop were coins. In fact she testified that she never examined the contents of 
the boxes she received from the pawn shops. Due to this significant and 
critical gap in the chain of evidence, the judge would then be required to 
speculate as to the origin of the coins obtained from Attorney Cramer. Since 
Attorney Cramer did not testify, it is possible that he received the coins 
presented to the police from a criminal client or other source rather than from 
Attorney Miya. 
The problem with the burglary case is again there are significant gaps in 
evidence to attempt to tie the Defendant to the burglary. There is evidence that 
nine days prior to the burglary the Defendant was served with papers in the 
cemetery across the street from the home. There is evidence that the Defendant 
was in St. George and pawned items similar to those stolen from the home. 
That is the extent of the evidence for the burglary. There were no fingerprints 
from the Defendant found at the scene. The vehicle stolen at the time was 
found hot wired and abandon over a month later in Scenic, Arizona. It is 
significant to note that the vehicle was known to have been driven two weeks 
after the Defendant had been continuously incarcerated in jail. 
Additionally, the evidence regarding the laptop computer calls the 
validity of the verdict in question. The victim testified that utilizing computer 
technologies she was able to establish that her computer IP address had been 
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utilized on two dates the Defendant was incarcerated in the St. George jail. 
While the evidence also indicated that the computer had been used shortly after 
the burglary occurred and while the Defendant was out of jail, the fact that it 
was thereafter used during periods of the Defendant's incarceration calls into 
question the possession of the stolen item by the Defendant. 
The final element is that the error was harmful. Based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence the Defendant should not have been convicted. 
Therefore, he was prejudiced by the court's failure to dismiss the case, and his 
convictions should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY THE TRIAL COURT'S EARLY 
DENIAL OF OBJECTIONS, WHICH TRAINED THE 
DEFENDANT NOT TO OBJECT AND BY HIS FAILURE 
TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, 
the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
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assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80L.Ed.2dat693. 
While the defendant recognizes that he made an effectual waiver of 
counsel and elected to proceed in a pro se capacity, his right to effective 
assistance of counsel is nonetheless guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
Although there are numerous cases that say that once a defendant makes the 
election proceeding in a pro se capacity, he thereafter cannot complain of 
ineffective assistance. (State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ^ 5, 147 P.3d 543) 
That does not end the inquiry there. 
In the recent case of Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 86, fl2, 76 P.3d 
1170, this Court was presented with a case wherein the defendant validly 
waived his right to counsel and elected to proceed in a pro se capacity. 
Thereafter the court made some errors which affected the outcome of the trial 
This Court, in reviewing those errors, stated: 
Although a pro se defendant is required to adhere to procedural 
rules and the law, leniency may be appropriate in limited 
circumstances. A pro se defendant's "lack of technical 
knowledge of law and procedure...should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged." In some 
instances, lack of accurate advice by the trial court may be 
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"fundamentally unfair" for pro se party. (Citations omitted, 
emphasis added) 
The Court further stated that, "We therefore conclude defendant was misled by 
the trial court and the city and consequently, defendant was unfairly deprived 
of the jury trial." (Id. at f 13) 
In the present case there were numerous errors committed by the trial 
court that improperly implied to the Defendant that his valid objections were 
invalid. On two occasions early in the trial the Defendant suggested to the court 
that the state was leading its witnesses. After several leading questions, the 
Defendant, acting in a pro se capacity, finally objected to the leading questions, 
which objection was overruled. (R.308 /104) Immediately after the objection, 
the prosecution went through the following set of questions: 
Q. Did you tell [detective Quinney] that certain coins would not 
be there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would those have been the ones that were in your cabinet? 
A. They were the ones left in the cabinet. (R.308/104) 
The Defendant again objected to the prosecution's leading statements. 
This objection came immediately after the prosecutor asked a witness 
concerning a specific date to which he answered he did not remember. The 
prosecutor then posed a question as follows: 
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Q. Now, calling your attention back to that period of time soon 
after - or in the 20, say in August of 2003. You indicated that 
you were at the tattoo parlor or the tattoo shop. Did you see-? 
The defendant lodged his objection; however, the court ruled that the question 
was not objectionable and could be answered. (R.308/147, 148) The 
prosecution again followed with another leading question: 
Q. Were you, on the date that the defendant came into your store, 
acquainted with the fact that your brother-in-law's home at 481 
East 2850 North in North Ogden had been burglarized, and Serena, 
your sister in law's car stolen? (R.308 A48) 
The Defendant made no further objections to leading questions because 
he had been trained by the trial court that these objections would not be 
sustained. 
The same thing occurred in regard to the introduction of improper 
evidence, which constituted hearsay confrontation clause violations. As 
I 
discussed in Point I above, the trial court allowed into evidence information 
which constituted hearsay, a violation of the Defendant's right to cross-
examine witnesses, which was clearly objectionable. One such instance 
occurred during the testimony of Detective Quinney who testified that Deputy 
Cardinal told him that the victim's vehicle had been located in Scenic, Arizona. 
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(R.308 111 A) Mr. Underwood objected to this testimony and to the receiving of 
photographs of the location where the car was supposedly found; however, the 
court overruled those objections. (R.308 /217) 
Furthermore, the Defendant made objections regarding the introduction 
into evidence of the coins question and his attorney's testimony regarding its 
coins. (R.308 / 56-64) Although the objections made by the Defendant 
specifically revolved around his attorney client privilege, he certainly did not 
believe that it was proper for the State to introduce evidence regarding the 
coins allegedly obtained by his counsel and delivered to Attorney Cramer's 
office. Although the Defendant did not properly articulate that objection, it 
should have been obvious to the trial court that there was a chain of custody 
issue regarding the coins. Based upon the Defendant's earlier objections, the 
trial court should have excluded the evidence. 
Perhaps the most telling effect of this in proper devised by the trial court 
occurred at one point when the Defendant was asked by the court whether or 
not he objected to the introduction of an exhibit and the following discussion 
occurred. 
THE COURT: ...Mr. Underwood, any objections to [Exhibit] 16? 
MR. UNDERWOOD: Doesn't matter if I object or not. 
36 
THE COURT: It clearly matters, Mr. Underwood. I'm just trying 
to rule on the law as I have it. Do you have objections to 
that? 
MR. UNDERWOOD: Whatever (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Thank you. It's received. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 16 received) 
( Trial transcript page 186 lines 2-8) 
The right of an accused to confront witnesses against him is a 
fundamental right guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. See, 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah 1990). The Defendant's 
constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court 
allowed hearsay evidence on several important issues from numerous State's 
witnesses. 
The Defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine these 
important witnesses against him. The judge heard numerous hearsay 
statements during the course of the trial as described above. All of these 
statements were hearsay. 
In State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "[i]f the evidence violates a defendant's right to confront 
witnesses, it should not be admitted." Id. at 480. The Court then adopted a 
37 
two-part test to evaluate the extent of a violation of the right to confrontation. 
Id. "First, we look at whether the State's presentation of hearsay testimony of 
extrajudicial statements or occurrences is 'crucial to the state's case or 
'devastating' to the defendant.'" Id. 
In the case at bar, the hearsay testimony was clearly devastating to the 
Defendant. Virtually the entire substance of evidence produced at trial 
regarding the coins and the stolen vehicle were hearsay. Although the original 
testimony regarding the missing vehicle would not constitute hearsay, the 
evidence as to where the vehicle was ultimately located, and numerous aspects 
concerning the vehicle were all hearsay statements. Furthermore, virtually all 
of the testimony regarding the finding of the coins that were adduced as 
exhibits at trial, the chain of custody on the coins, as well as other aspects of 
the coins constituted hearsay statements. 
Since the hearsay testimony was devastating to the Defendant, the first 
part of the hearsay test is met. The second part of the test is to "look at the 
availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the declarant will add 
any probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to observe the 
demeanor of the witness." Id. 
This part of the test is rather obvious. In this particular case there is 
simply no reason that the prosecution did not call these witnesses to testify. 
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There was no showing that they were unavailable, most were located within the 
State of Utah or very close nearby, and in fact, other witnesses were called to 
testify with no apparent difficulty. The fact that Defendant was unable to cross-
examine and establish biases, inconsistencies, and possible ulterior motives 
undermines the abilities of even an effective defense counsel. 
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 1000, S.Ct. 2531 (1980), the Supreme 
Court articulated a two-part test for determining the admissibility of hearsay 
when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial. First, 
there must be a showing of 'unavailability.' Second, if the declarant is 
unavailable, the statement at issue is admissible only if it bears adequate 
indicia of reliability. Id at 56, 1000 S.Ct. at 2539 (1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1994), "that constitutional unavailability is found only when it is 'practically 
impossible to produce the witness in court.'" Id. at 402 (quoting, State v. Webb, 
779P.2datl l l3) . 
The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Menzies, that "unavailability will 
not be found merely because the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand 
or ... testifying would be stressful. In short, every reasonable effort must be 
made to produce the witness." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
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Pursuant to Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, none of the 
declarants could be classified as an unavailable witness. Neither can any of the 
hearsay statements fit under any of the general hearsay exceptions. None of 
the statements would ban against pecuniary interest, none would be general 
business records, or any of the other exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
Even if the witnesses could be declared unavailable, that still violates the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The right of a defendant in 
a criminal case to confront his accusers is paramount and supersedes any 
limitation or exception through hearsay rules. The United States Supreme 
Court has recently ruled on this issue in the case of Crawford vs. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 U.S. (2004). In that case, Justice Scalia, writing 
for a unanimous Court, held that the use of an out-of-court statement by a wife 
against her husband, when his claims of marital privilege precluded her in 
court testimony, would not be allowed because where testimonial statements 
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is confrontation." Emphasis added. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE COINS 
OBTAINED FROM ATTORNEY CRAMER'S OFFICE 
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WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY 
ESTABLISH A PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF 
EVIDENCE 
During the course of the trial, the State introduced evidence regarding a 
box of coins that were seized from the offices of Attorney Aric Cramer. Over 
the objection of the Defendant, his previous counsel Attorney Miya testified 
she had picked up two boxes, with unknown contents, from two separate 
pawnshops. She testified that she had never looked into the boxes, did not 
know their contents, and had simply kept the boxes in her office until she later 
delivered those to new counsel Aric Cramer. Mr. Cramer was never called to 
testify and therefore could not establish any evidence regarding these issues. 
The State never made a showing that Mr. Cramer was unavailable to testify. 
After that significant break in the chain of custody, the State put on 
evidence through Mr. Weight that he went to the offices of Aric Cramer, 
reviewed a number of coins which were sitting on his table, and determined 
that they were similar to those coins which were taken from his home during 
the burglary. 
In State v. Eagle Book, Inc., 583 P.2d 73 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "[t]he circumstances surrounding the preservation and 
custody of the article and the likelihood of tampering are factors to be 
considered in determining its admissibility." Id. at 74. In State v. Watson, 684 
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P.2d 39 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated the chain of custody 
doctrine "has its greatest force where the physical evidence in question is 
fungible or subject to alteration. In those circumstances, the chain of custody 
is required to show that there has been no tampering, alteration, or substitution 
of the evidence." Id. at 40. 
While the Defendant understands that deficiencies in the chain may go to 
the weight, the State still needs to lay the appropriate foundation before the 
evidence can be admitted into evidence. In United States v. Clonts, 966 F.2d 
1366 (10th Cir. 1992), the Court stated that, "[t]he degree of proof needed to 
establish an uninterrupted chain of custody depends upon the nature of the 
evidence at issue. If the evidence is unique, readily identifiable and resistant to 
change, the foundation for admission need only be testimony that the evidence 
is what it purports to be." Id. at 1368. In the case at bar, an important part of 
the evidence are the coins seized from Attorney Cramer's office. These are not 
"readily identifiable", and in fact could not be positively identified by the 
witnesses at trial. Although Mr. Weight claimed that the coins were similar, he 
could not say that they were the same coins that were taken from his home nor 
did the lists produced by the victim match the list of coins obtained at attorney 
Cramer's office. Therefore, "the trial court requires a more elaborate chain of 
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custody to establish that the evidence has not been tampered with or altered." 
Id. 
In United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1989), the Court 
stated that the "condition precedent to the admission of real evidence is met by 
providing the proper foundation." The Court also stated that if the evidence 
was not readily identifiable, "the trial court requires a more stringent 
foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness 
to render it improbable that the original item h^s either been exchanged with 
another or been contaminated or tampered with." Id. at 1531 (emphasis in 
original, quotations and citations omitted). 
In the present case there is no explanation why the prosecution did not 
call Mr. Cramer to testify. There was no showing of unavailability, they had 
made arrangements previously to call Attorney Miya and did in fact call her to 
testify; and had they called Mr. Cramer to testify, the Defendant would have 
been able to exercise his constitutional right to confront his accusers. The 
prosecution's failure to establish a critical link in the chain of custody should 
be grounds for reversal. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE SEVERAL EXHIBITS OVER THE 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AND AFTER THE 
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PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENDANT HAD BOTH 
RESTED THEIR CASE. 
Rule 17 (g)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
after both the prosecution and the defense has rested its case, "thereafter, the 
parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, 
otherwise permits" In State v. Gergorious, 16 P.2d 893,895 Utah (1932), the 
State was permitted to reopen the case after the state had rested. However, in 
the case at hand, the Defendant, pro se and following the State's lead, rested as 
well. In these circumstances, not only did the Defendant rely on the State's 
decision to rest in moving to rest himself, but when the Judge allowed the State 
to go back and admit further exhibit items, the Defendant was not prepared and 
could not (especially acting pro se) react quickly enough to counter effectively 
after the Defendant thought the case was closed. 
In the case of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah, 1986), the Court 
was presented with a case where at preliminary hearing the State failed to put 
on sufficient evidence to support a bind over. Thereafter the State attempted to 
refile the case and hold another preliminary hearing putting on the additional 
evidence. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that due process concerns prohibited 
a second preliminary hearing under the following due process considerations: 
We find merit in the approach taken by the Oklahoma courts. In 
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1971), the 
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Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that due process 
considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling criminal 
charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the 
prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling. 
While the Defendant recognizes that the current case does not involve the 
refiling of the case after a failed preliminary hearing, the same concepts should 
apply where the State has failed to put on sufficient evidence and the 
Defendant has rested his case in reliance thereon. While the Defendant 
recognizes that the case of State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, \ 12, 151 P.3d 171, 
allowed the continuation of the preliminary hearing based upon a prosecutor's 
motion, the Court continued to recognize the due process concerns involved in 
such a continuance. In that case the Court stated, "Continuances present none 
of the potentially abusive practices Brickey and its progeny sought to prevent. 
A defendant's due process rights are rarely implicated when a continuance is 
allowed."(Id. atf 12) 
In a case cited by the Utah Supreme Court, State v. McClelland, 24 
Wash. App. 689, 604 P.2d 969, 971 (1979) (quoted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1983) at 146), when the proceeding 
did not adjourn, and the defendants were still present, the trial court was said to 
have had discretion to permit reopening the cas0. 
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But the case at hand is here distinguished again because the State and 
Defendant both rested in a bench trial, not a jury trial, and the defendant was 
pro se, not with counsel. And thirdly, in the Dyer decision cited above, the 
Utah court explained that although there was an adjournment in that case, it did 
not signal the conclusion of the trial because the purpose of the adjournment 
was clearly "to provide counsel adequate opportunity to prepare additional 
arguments...and thus assist the court in reaching its ultimate and final 
decision." State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1983). In the case at hand the 
resting of both parties signaled the conclusion of the trial, especially in the 
eyes of the Defendant, who was not an attorney but a pro se lay person. When 
the judge allowed exhibits in after the resting by the State, followed by the 
Defendant, the purpose of the court's actions were not only confusing but 
unfair to the Defendant who did not know how to react. Although the cases 
cited above support a showing of no error by the judge, the case at hand is 
distinguished due to the facts that this was a bench trial, the defendant was pro 
se, and the State and Defendant both rested their cases. This resting by both 
parties was surely reasonably read by Defendant to be an adjournment of the 
case and confusing to the Defendant when suddenly more exhibits were 




THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A 
FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE 
NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT OCCURRED DURING HIS 
TRIAL, 
Even if all of the errors were individually harmless, they were 
cumulatively harmful. Under the cumulative error doctrine this Court should 
reverse the Defendant's conviction. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we 
will reverse only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our 
confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177, 186 
(Utah2000). 
The errors in the Defendant's trial were numerous. They started during 
the State's opening statement and continued until the rebuttal portion of the 
State's closing argument. They have been outlined and briefed above. The 
result of these many errors was that the Defendant did not receive a fair trial 
and was not afforded the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. For 
this reason, the conviction should be reversed and the Defendant should be 
granted a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The State failed to prove all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Based on the lack of evidence, reasonable minds should have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crimes he was convicted of. 
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For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
convictions. In the alternative, the Defendant believes that his due process 
rights were violated by the numerous cumulative errors of the trial court, and 
therefore respectfully request this Court to reverse the conviction and remand 
for a new trial. 
DATED this ^ f d a y of April 2008. 
LNDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 31, 19 63 
Video 
Tape Number: B1103 05 Tape Count: 10:27 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/27/2005 Guilty 
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/27/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in custody 
and is represented by Bernie Allen, public defender. Court proceeds 
with sentencing. 
Page 1 
Case No: 041906660 
Date: Nov 03, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court recommends a concurrent sentence. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court orders restitution in the amount of $17,147.44 on behalf 
of State Farm Insurance and $825.00 on behalf of the Shirl Weight 
to be collected by the Department of Corrections upon the 
defendant's parole. 
Dated this g day of //hi/ ,/^OS. 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
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Rule 504. Lawyer-client 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, association, 
or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered 
professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view 
to obtaining professional legal services. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to 
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in a 
rendition of professional legal services. 
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain 
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on 
behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the 
lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the course of 
representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and the client's 
representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to the 
professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third 
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition 
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and 
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services 
to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, 
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of 
common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's 
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common 
interest, in any combination. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege? The privilege may be claimed by the client, 
the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased 
client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, 
association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person 
who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to have 
authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1} Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or 
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client 
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or 
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant 
to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client 
regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by 
inter vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an 
issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the 
lawyer; or 
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue 
concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or 
(5} Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common 
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any 
of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an 
action between any of the clients. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 504 is based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United States Supreme 
Court. Rule 504 would replace and supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) 
and is intended to be consistent with the ethical obligations of confidentiality 
set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Committee revised the proposed rule of the United States Supreme Court 
to address the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 ; 101 S. 
Ct. 677 [1981], as to when communications involving representatives of a 
corporation are protected by the privilege. The Committee rejected limiting 
the privilege to members of the "control group" and added as subparagraph 
(a)(4) a definition for "representative of the client" that includes within the 
privilege disclosures not only of the client and the client's formal 
spokesperson, but also employees who are specifically authorized to 
communicate to the lawyer concerning a legal matter. The word "specifically" 
is intended to preclude a general authorization from the client for the client's 
employees to communicate under the cloak of the privilege, but is intended to 
allow the client, as related to a specific matter, to authorize the client's 
employees as "representatives" to disclose information to the lawyer as to 
that specific matter with confidence that the disclosures will remain within 
the lawyer-client privilege. 
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be directly paid by the lawyer as 
long as the representative meets the requirement of being engaged to assist 
the lawyer in providing legal services. Thus, a person paid directly by the 
client but working under the control and direction of the lawyer for the 
purposes of providing legal services satisfies the requirements of 
subparagraph (a)(3). Similarly, a representative of the client who may be an 
independent contractor, such as an independent accountant, consultant or 
person providing other services, is a representative of the client for purposes 
of subparagraph (a)(5) if such person has been engaged to provide services 
reasonably related to the subject matter of the legal services or whose service 
is necessary to provide such service. 
The client is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential 
communication, but also to prevent disclosure by the lawyer or others who 
were involved in the conference or learned, without the knowledge of the 
client, the content of the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are 
dealt with by Rule 507. 
Under subparagraph (b) communications among the various people involved 
in the legal matter, relating to the providing of legal services, are all privileged, 
except for communications between clients. Those are privileged only if they 
are part of a conference with others involved in legal services. 
Subparagraph (c) allows the "successor, trustee, or similar representative of a 
corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence" 
to claim the privilege. Where there is a dispute as to which of several persons 
has claims to the rights of a previously existing entity, the court will be 
required to determine from the facts which entity's claim is most consistent 
with the purposes of this rule. 
The Committee considered and rejected an exception to the rule for 
communications in furtherance of a tort. Disallowing the privilege where the 
lawyer's services are sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud is consistent 
with the trend in other states. The Committee considered extending the 
exception to include "intentional torts," but concluded that because of the 
broad range of conduct that may be found to be an intentional tort, such an 
exception would create undesirable ambiguities and uncertainties as to when 
the privilege applies. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically 
enumerated, and further endorsed the concept that in the area of exceptions, 
the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing 
the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to 
avoid any possible clashes with the common law concepts of "waiver." 
ADDEMDUM C 
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Examples of leading questions and hearsay testimony from the 
record: 
Below, find a grand total of 216 instances of leading by Mr. Daines 
throughout the trial, only several of which the Defendant objects to, but 
because he is trained not to object, the entire trial results in the prosecutor 
speaking for the witnesses. Furthermore, find 17 instances of allowed 
hearsay throughout this bench trial, with the Defendant representing 
himself, pro se, having waived his right to a jury and putting his fate in the 
hands of the Judge. Below, labeled as "NOTE" find instances where the 
Court trained the Defendant not to object and to feel that objecting to 
leading questions and hearsay instances would be useless. 
Mr. Daines Direct of Ms. Susan Wyatt Weight at (R. 309/19): 
Leading Questions Hearsay 
(R. 308/22) line 3-4,15-16,18-20, 24 
(R. 308/23) line 20 - 21 
[R. 308/24) line 1 
(R. 308/25) line 11-12 
(R. 308/26) line 16,18 
(R. 308/27) line 20, 23-24 
(R. 308/28) line 23-24 
(R. 308/29) line 17 
(R. 308/32) line 22-24 
(R. 308/33) line 6-7,15,17-19 
(R. 308/34) line 9, 20, 23-24 
[R. 308/36} line 9 
[R. 308/37} line 12 
(R. 308/38} line 6, 8-10,19 
(R. 308/40} line 13-14,16-19 
(R. 308/41} line 7-10 
[R. 308/42} line 17 - hearsay 
(R. 308/43} line 18-19 
(R. 308/44} line 12 
(R. 308/45) line 16, 20-21, 23-24 
(R. 308/46} line 25 - (R. 308/47} line 1 
(R. 308/50} line 5-8,11,21 
(R. 308/51} line 1-2,4 
[R. 308/52} line 2, 8 
(R. 308/53} line 5-6, 8 
Mr. Daines Direct of Ms. Miya at (R. 308/65): 
(R. 308/65) line 23-24 
(R. 308/66) line 1-2,4-5, 8,18-21, 
23, 66- (R. 308/67) line 1 
(R. 308/67) line 3-4 
(R. 308/68) line 18-19, 21-22 
At fR. 308/88) Mr. Daines Direct of Mr. Shervl Reed Weight: 
Leading Hearsay 
(R. 308/89) line 14 
(R. 308/94) line 6-7,14 
(R. 308/96) line 17-19 
(R. 308/97) line 1-2,4-5, 9,13-15, 
17,19-20 
(R. 308/98} line 1-2, 8-9, 21-22 
(R. 308/99) line 10-11, 21 
(R. 308/100) line 2-3, 5-6,13 
(R. 308/101) line 23-24 
(R. 308/102) line 12,14,17,19 
(R. 308/103) line 7-8, 9-10, 
19-20: Statements that 
assertive conduct by Cramer 
was to show coins - he is not 
there to testify to this 
statement of conduct and 
therefore these statements of 
what he did is hearsay. 
(R. 308/104) line 6-8 (To which 
Mr. Underwood Objects, is 
Overruled, and leading again seen) 
line 23-24. 
(R. 308/105) line 13-14 
(R. 308/106) line 4-5 
(R.308/108) line 11-12 
(R. 308/110) line 1,10-11 
(R.308/111) line 24-25 
(R. 308/112) line 2-3 
(R. 308/123) line 21-22 
(R. 308/143) line 5, 8-9,13-14,16-18 
Direct of Charles Dale Hall by Mr. Daines. R. 308/145 to 154): 
Leading Hearsay 
(R. 308/146) line 20-22 
(R. 308/147) line 5-7,12-15 
(R. 308/148) line 14 
(R. 308/149) line 1, 3, 5, 20 
(R. 308/150) line 21-22, 24-25 
(R. 308/151) line 2,11-12 
(R. 308/152) line 4-5, 7, 9, 21 
(R. 308/153) line 9,16-18 
Direct of Serena Weight by Mr. Daines at (R. 308/158): 
Leading Hearsay 
(R. 308/158) line 11-12 
(R. 308/ 159) line 6, 8,18 
(R. 308/162) line 3-4,13,18-19, 23, 25 
(R. 308/163) line 15-16 
(R. 308/165) line 8,17,21-22 
(R. 308/166) line 6-7,18, 22-23 
[R. 308/167) line 5 
(R. 308/169) line 4, 23-24 
(R. 308/170) line 13-14, 20-21 
(R. 308/171) line 3, 8,10 
(R. 308/173) line 20 
(R. 308/175) linel6-17 
(R. 308/176) line 12-14 
Direct of Antionette Wyatt Weight by Mr. Daines (R. 308/1781: 
Leading Hearsay 
(R. 308/178) line 5-6, 8,10-11,15,17-18 
(R. 308/179) line 2-3,17, 20-21, 25 
(R. 308/180) line 12,14 
(R. 308/181) line 2-3 
NOTE* Re: Training examples: (R. 308/184 Defendant cites hearsay as to 
the content of the purse, as there is no itemized description re: Exhibit P2. 
The Court notes the objection but allows the evidence, noting the issue of 
weight). 
NOTE* Re: Mr. Underwood, Defendant, being trained to not object at (R. 
308/186) line 2-8: This passage represents the tone of the entire trial on 
record - the Defendant feeling ignored and trained not to object - that his 
objections will not be heard and he is wrong to object - that it is useless 
for him to object, when in fact, there were many instances where an 
objection would have been proper: 
THE COURT: ...Mr. Underwood, any objections to [Exhibit] 16? 
MR. UNDERWOOD: Doesn't matter if I object or not. 
THE COURT: It clearly matters, Mr. Underwood. I'm just trying to 
rule on the law as I have it. Do you have objections to that? 
MR. UNDERWOOD: Whatever (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Thank you. It's received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 received) 
Also see result of Defendant's "training" regarding motions at: (R. 
308/186) line 23-24: "...I seem to be ignored on this..." 
Direct of Mr. lason Ray by Mr. Daines at (R. 309/1891: 
Leading Hearsay 
(R. 309/189) line 18-20 
(R. 309/192) line 19-20 (R. 309/192) line 14-18 (The 
P.D. is not testifying here - this 
evidence is hearsay. 
(R. 309/194) line 10-11,15-16,23-24 (R. 309/194) linelO-20(No 
presentation of this public 
knowledge - he is not the 
Sheriffs Department nor the 
Government and can not speak 
to this - the evidence presented 
is hearsay. 
(R. 309/195) line 195 
(R. 309/197) line 11, 22 
Direct of Mr. Dirk Ouinney by Mr. Daines at (R. 309/202): 
Leading Hearsay 
(R. 309/202) line 16-19, 25 
(R. 309/203) line 2,19 (R. 309/203) line 10 Coin 
evidence is hearsay - there is not 
a valid foundation for this 
evidence by Mr. Quinney because 
he did not pick the coin up 
himself from the Pawn Shop, and 
(R. 309/204} line 12-13 
(R. 309/206} line 4-8 
(R. 309/207} line 8-9,18-19, 21-22 
(R. 309/208} line 25 
(R. 309/209} line 1-3, 5-6,16-18, 20 
(R. 309/210} line 1-3, 8, 20-23, 25 
(R. 309/211} line 1,12-13,15-16 
did not even recognize the voice 
of the Pawn Shop worker on the 
phone, not to mention that below, 
(on page 204 of the record}, 
Assistant Chief Warren and Chief 
Affuvai, who were said to have 
picked up the coin, were not 
witnesses, not crossed, and 
therefore this is all Hearsay, 
through p 205: 
(R.309/204} line 4-25 (*20-23} 
(R. 309/205} line 1-6 (Neither 
testimony nor cross of Assistant 
Chief Kevin D. Warren: All Coin 
evidence. 
(R. 309/208} line 11-22 
(line 18-19, St. George P.D.} 
(R. 309/213} line 17-18 (Ford 
had no record but Ford not 
called to testify nor crossed re: 
this information so it's hearsay 
(R. 309/214} line 5 - Deputy 
Cardinal, Mojave County 
Sheriff's Office was never called 
nor crossed on the stand... and 
therefore, the location re: 
testimony and photographs are 
hearsay, although allowed by 
the judge - objected to by the 
Defendant, but allowed by the 
Judge. 
(R. 309/214) line 12-14,16, 21-23 
(R. 309/215) line 1-3, 9-11 
(R. 309/217) line 17-19, 24-25 
(R. 309/218) line 8 (whole pg?! (R. 309/218) line 3-5 (Tri State 
not called to testify to this fact 
nor crossed regarding this 
evidence. 
(R. 309/219) line 18-20; Deputy 
Cardinal with the Mojave County 
not called/crossed... 
(R. 309/220) l inel0-l l , 21 
(R. 309/222) line 22 
(R. 309/223) line 3-4, 20-21, 25 
(R. 309/224) linel, 3,13-14, 21-22 
(R. 309/225) line 11-12 
(R. 309/227) line 10-12,14 
*NOTE (R. 309/228) Mr. Bouhwuis makes clear he is not objecting for the 
Defendant: line 14-16: not protecting him from hearsay by objecting...* 
Direct of Mr. Mohamed Amer by Mr. Daines. at (R. 309/277): 
Leading Hearsay 
(R. 309/278) line 2,4, 6,16-17 (line 20 - 23 hearsay): no one 
from the sheriffs department is 
testifying to this procedure so it 
is hearsay - and they are being 
offered for their truth - that this 
was an alleged contract 
between the Defendant and the 
Pawn Shop in Salt Lake, where 
Amer was manager - the Judge 
allows contracts not signed to 
be entered into evidence 
without a proper foundation -
without the signed contracts 
supposedly now located at the 
sheriffs office but no one from 
the Sherriff s office is there to 
testify to that fact, nor to be 
crossed regarding that fact to 
guard against testamentary 
infirmities. 
(R. 309/279) line 16-17,19-20, 24-25 
(R. 309/280) line 11-12 
(R. 309/281) line 2-4 
(R. 309/282) line 24 
(R. 309/283) line 6,19, 21 
Back to Direct of Mr. Dirk Ouinney at (R. 309/2911: 
Leading Hearsay 
(R. 309/291) line 15-16 
(R. 309/292) line 10,12,16-17 
(R. 309/293) line 1,14-18, 23-25 
(R. 309/292) line 6-13 previous 
witness Dale Hall—did not say 
this but prosecutor tried to lead 
him into this testimony at page 
146-7. 
